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IS SECTARIANISM A BAR TO EXEMPTION
FROM TAXATION AS A " PURELY
PUBLIC CHARITY ?"
In other words, is a charitable use to be denied exemption
from taxation as a purely public charity solely because its
benefits are confined to the members of a particular religious
sect ?
The question arises under Article IX of the Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1874. Sections i and 2 read as follows:
Section i. "All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of
subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the
tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws; but the
General Assembly may, by general laws, exempt from taxation
public property used for public purposes, actual places of religious
worship, places of burial not used or held for private or corporate
profit, and institutions of purely public charity.
Section 2. "All laws exempting property from taxation, other
- than the property above enumerated, shall be void."
In pursuance of the constitutional warrant-for the Consti-
tution itself confers no exemption-the Act of May 14, 1874,1
was passed, providing as follows:
IP. L. 158.
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"All churches, meeting houses or other regular places of stated
worship, with the grounds thereto annexed necessary for the occu-
pancy and enjoyment of the same; all burial grounds not used or
held for private or corporate profit ; all hospitals, universities, col-
leg~s, seminaries, academies, associations and institutions of learn-
ing, benevolence or charity, with the grounds thereto annexed and
necessary for the occupancy and enjoyment of the same, founded,
endowed and maintained by public or private charity; and all
school houses belonging to any county, borough or school district,
with the grounds thereto annexed and necessary for the occupancy
and enjoyment of the same; and all court houses and jails, with the
grounds thereto annexed, be and the same are hereby exempted
from all and every county, city, borough, bounty, road, school and
poor tax: Provided,"' &c.
It may be observed, in passing, that it can make no differ-
ence in the case of the charity under consideration whether
the claim to exemption is assigned to the omission of the
legislature to subject the institution to taxation prior to 1873,2
or to a special Act of Assembly passed after the constitu-
tional amendment of 1857,' or, indeed, to the general Act of
April 8, 1873,' which provides for the exemption of, inter
alia, "all charitable institutions founded by charitable gifts
or otherwise, the chief revenues for the support of which are
derived from voluntary contributions, together with the lands
attached to the same." For, in the end, it comes to this:
That any claim to exemption from taxation must now be
tested by the Act of May 14, 1874, above cited, as read in
the light of the present Constitution.
To repeat, then, may a sectarian charity be regarded as
'an institution of benevolence or charity, purely public,
founded, endowed, and maintained by public or private
charity'? Upon the answer to this question depends the
right of the institution to exemption.
' The proviso (unconstitutional) has no bearing upon the subject in
hand.
2 Philadelphia v. Barber, 16o Pa. 123, 128 (1894).
3 Wagner Institute v. City of Philadelphia, 18 Phila. 285 (I886),
affirmed in 116 Pa. 555 (1887) ; Wagner Institute v. Philadelphia, 132 Pa.
612 (189o) ; Philadelphia v. Jewish Hospital Association, 148 Pa. 454
(1892); Philadelphia v. Masonic Home, i6o Pa. 572 (1894).
4 P. L. 64; supplied by Act of May 14, 1874 (P. L. 158). And see
Constitution of 1874, Art. IX, 2; Schedule, 2.
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Of course, a charity is none the less a charity because its
benefits are reserved for the members of a certain sect. In a
popular sense, such a charity may be termed a public benevo-
lence, in that its beneficiaries form an indefinite class of the
community at large. But, according to reason and prece-
dent, it would seem not to be a charity "completely, en-
tirely, unqualifiedly"' (or "purely") publfc, and, therefore,
not entitled to exemption from taxation.
It must be granted that, inasmuch as the charity in ques-
tion falls within the letter of the Act of May 14, 1874, it is
.priinafacie a proper subject of exemption; and the burden of
proof would be upon the taxing power to show that, "to
apply the language of the act to this particular case, would be
a violation of the co nstitutional provision."2  But, in spite of
this presumption in its favor, the conclusion that a sectarian
charity forfeits its claim to exemption by reason alone of its
sectarian discrimination is thought to be free from substan-
tial doubt as the law of Pennsylvania stands to-day.
The first proposition in Penn's Charter of Privileges, ac-
cepted by the Assembly on the 28th day of October, 1701, is
couched in the following terms:
"Because no people can be truly happy, though under the
greatest enjoyment of civil liberties, if abridged of the freedom of
their consciences as to their religious profession and worship ; and
Almighty God being the only Lord of conscience, Father of lights
and spirits, and the author as well as object of all divine knowl-
edge, faith and worship, who only doth enlighten the mind and
persuade and convince the understandings of people, I do hereby
grant and declare that no person or persons inhabiting in this
province or territories, who shall confess and acknowledge one
Almighty God, the creator, upholder and ruler of the world, and
profess him or themselves obliged to live quietly under the civil
government, shall be in any case molested or prejudiced in his or
their person or estate because of his or their conscientious per-
suasion or practice, nor be compelled to frequent or maintain any
religious worship-place or ministry contrary to his or their mind,
or to do or suffer any other act or thing contrary to their religious
1 Mitchell, J., in Philadelphia Library Co. v. Donohugh, 12 Phila. 284,
289 (1877), affirmed in 86 Pa. 306 (1878).
2 Green, J., in Burd Orphan Asylum v. School District, go Pa. 21, 34
(1880).
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persuasion. And that all persons who also profess to believe in
Jesus Christ, the Saviour of the World, shall be capable (notwith-
standing their other persuasions and practices in point of con-
science and religion) to serve this government in any capacity,
both legislatively and executively, . . ."I
And, if there could be any doubt about the matter, cita-
tions of like import might be multiplied to attest the uniform
and resolute purpose of the people of Pennsylvania at every
stage of its history to accord public recognition-whether to
help or to hurt-to no creed but the broad faith of Chris-
tianity.
"Christianity is part of the common law of this state,"
was said, indeed, in the old case of Updegraplz v. Common-
wealth,' where the "constitutionality" of Christianity was in
question. But the common law of Pennsylvania has gone no
further in the ordering of men's consciences. "The minds of
William Penn and his followers would have revolted at the
idea of an established church. Liberty to all, but preference
to none; this has been our principle, and this our practice." '
" By general Christianity is not intended the doctrine of wor-
ship of any particular church or sect; the law leaves these
disputes to theologians." 4
This attitude of the state toward religion has ever been
maintained,5 and the plain significance of it all must be that
no person, taken as a member of society, shall be either favored
or prejudiced by reason of his affiliation with this or that par-
ticular sect. It is enough that he accepts the ecumenical
creed of Christianity and conforms to its catholic canons.
His rights and duties as a member of the community are in
no wise made to depend upon the confession of a special
creed or the practice of an esoteric cult.
1 i Dallas' Laws, Appendix, page 9. See, likewise, Statutes at Large
of Pennsylvania, Vol. II, page 3 and page 171 ; also Article I, Sections 3
and 4 of the Constitution of 1874.
2 11S. &R. 394, 4o6 (1824).
3 Tilghman, C. J., in Guardians of the Poor v. Greene, 5 Binney, 554,
558 (1 83).
4 Updegraph y. Commonwealth, ii S. & R. 394, 408 (1824), etflassim.
5 I Snarhawk v. Union Passenger Railway Co., 54 Pa. 401 (1867).
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I Now, broadly considered, a charity is " a gift to a general
public use."' The beneficiaries take in their right as members
of the general public, and not as individuals. If the gift be
to "the poor of Philadelphia," it is a purely public charity.
So, if the gift be to " the Christian poor of a city ;" for the
law takes note of the Christian religion. But a gift to "the
poor members of a particular sect in Philadelphia" is not a
gift to the public at all, in a legal sense; for the denomina-
tional test is not sanctioned by the law, and creates a distinc-
tion with which the public at large is in no manner concerned.
Such a gift is lawful and beneficent, but it cannot be termed
public; much less "purely public," as the Constitution
enjoins.
It might be argued that the condition in regard to member-
ship in a certain religious sect not only excludes the general
public, but seeks and tends to promote the particular interests
and influence of that sect; and that, so, for an added reason,
such a charity should be regarded as an institution of private
benevolence. But this aspect of the case throws no light
upon the main question; for the law looks at the practical
effect of charity, and cares nothing for the motive that
prompts the gift. As the Supreme Court has said: "The
true test of a legal public charity is the object sought to be
attained; the purpose to which the money is to be applied;
not the motive of the donor."' It should be explained that
the denominational pride referred to is honorable and not
unworthy, and that without its stimulus countless deeds of
charity would be left undone. But the spirit is none the less
selfish, exclusive, and private in its legal aspect; and, it must
be borne in mind, the controversy does not turn on sentiment,
but upon the solemn mandate of the whole people-the fun-
damental law..
In closing this general discussion, it should be observed
that it matters not that the administration and control of a
charity are in sectarian hands; for the law in respect to chari-
SJones v. Williams, Ambler, 652.
2 Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624, 646 (1888).
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ties heeds neither the motive nor the medium of the benefac-
tion, but regards its destination alone.1
The legal effect thus given to the words " of purely public
charity," contained in Article IX, Section I, of the Constitu-
tion of 1874, would seem to be in accord with the general
spirit and tenor of the organic law. In Article X, Section 2,
we find that, "No money raised for the support of the public
schools of the Commonwealth shall be appropriated to or used
for the support of any sectarian school ;" and in Article III,
Section 18, we read as follows: "No appropriations, except
for pensions or gratuities for military services, shall be made
for charitable, educational or benevolent purposes, to any
person or community, nor to any denominational or sectarian
institution, corporation or association." That is to say, in
conformity with the usage and policy of the common law,
sectarian religion shall not be made a matter of public con-
cern; the money of the people shall not be used in ease of
denominational endeavor, even though the cause be that of
education or the great cause of Charity.
It would seem to be no answer to say that these collateral
constitutional provisions were meant simply to prevent favor-
itism among the sects; for that reasoning would tend to the
conclusion that the Constitution would not preclude appro-
priations by the legislature to all the institutions in question.
Nor is it even plausible that the policy that prohibits direct
gifts to any sectarian charity should sanction indirect gifts to
all sectarian charities; for the burden laid on the people at
large is in both cases the same, and from their point of
view the exemption is always nothing more nor less than " an
annual appropriation of their money, in a sum equal to the
amount of taxes here imposed, for the benefit of a favored
few.")
2
The Constitution of I874e authorizes the legislature to
exempt from taxation (I) public property used for public
1 See Episcopal Academy v. Philadelphia, I5O Pa. 565 (1892) ; Mission-
ary Society v. Receiver of Taxes, 173 Pa. 456 (1896).
2 Dean, J., in Philadelphia v. Masonic Home, 16o Pa. 572, 580 (1894).
Art. IX, I.
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purposes, (2) actual places of religious worship, (3) places
of burial not used or held for private or corporate profit, and
(4) institutions of purely public charity. And it may be argued
that the express mention here of places of religious worship,
which are invariably sectarian, and of burial-grounds, which
are usually so, is conclusive against the intent sought to be
drawn from Section 2 of Article X and Section 18 of Article
III above referred to. But this is no more than saying that
the exceptions are inconsistent with the rule. The true rea-
soning would seem to be that sectarian churches and burial-
grounds enjoy immunity from taxation because the Constitu-
tion has made express provision for.their exemption, and in
spite of the general rule. The special grounds and policy of
those exemptions are well understood; and the exceptions,
being accounted for, serve to confirm and emphasize the
rule.
Turning, now, to the precedents, it may be conceded that
the precise question here presented is one of first impression.
While the interpretation of the constitutional phrase "institu-
tions of purely public charity" has been before the various
courts of the Commonwealth more than a hundred times since
1874, the legal bearing of sectarianism in this connection has
never been the subject of judicial decision. The dicta, how-
ever, are numerous, and with one notable exception' favor
the conclusion hereinabove announced. The most pertinent
decision is the recent case of Philadelzia v. Masonic Homne,
2
which will be examined at length hereinafter.
One of the earliest cases in point is Donohugl's Apeal,
decided in 1878, in which the Philadelphia Library was de-
clared to be an institution of purely public charity. The
opinion of the Court of Common Pleas, delivered by Mitchell,
J., was unanimously adopted by the Supreme Court in a brief
Per Curiam, and has always been referred to as the funda-
mental discussion of exemption under the present Constitu-
I Per Green, J., in Burd Orphan Asylum v. School District, 90 Pa. 2r,
35 (i88o).
2 i6o Pa. 572 (1894).
3 86 Pa. 306 (1878).
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tion. In the course of his opinion, Mitchell, J., observes' that
the word " purely" is used "to exclude those charities which
are private, or only quasi public, such as many religious aid
societies, and also those which, though public to some extent
or for some purposes, have, like Masonic lodges and similar
charities, some mixture of private with their public character."
This cause was heard in the Common Pleas before Mitchell
and Fell, JJ., now Justices of the Supreme Court; but the
present Supreme Bench includes none of the members of that
court that took part in the decision on appeal.
The case of Burd Orphan Asylum v. School District' was
first argued in the Supreme Court in I879? The opinion of
the court was delivered by Trunkey, J.,4 holding the Burd
Orphan Asylum not to be an institution of purely public charity.
In i88o, after a reargument of the case,5 Green, J. (who had
meantime taken the place of Woodward, J.) delivered the final
opinion of the court,6 holding the Burd Orphan Asylum to be
a purely public charity and therefore exempt from taxation.
It will be noticed that Sterrett, C. J., and Green, J., are the
only members of the present Supreme Court that took part in
the decision of that case.
Citations from the two successive opinions of the court may
profitably be compared:
Opinion by TRUNKEY, J.- I"The charity is not purely public,
for the reason that it is practically limited to white female orphan
children who shall have been baptized in the Protestant Episcopal
Church."
"If Pennsylvania Hospital closed its gates to all but Methodists
or Baptists, having recent injuries, the people would not believe it
a purely public charity in the intendment of their constitution. A
charity for the poor of a parish or township is public, but not if
confined to poor Presbyterians in the municipality." . . "To
1 At page 314.
2 9o Pa. 21 (I880).
Before Sharswood, C. J., and Mercur, Gordon, Paxson, Woodward,
Trunkey, and Sterrett, JJ.
4 Sharswood, C. J., and Mercur and Paxson, JJ., dissented.
5 Before Sharswood, C. J., and Mercur, Gordon, Trunkey, Sterrett, and
Green, JJ.
6 Gordon, Trunkey, and Sterrett, JJ., dissented.
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open [the doors of a blind asylum] only to the blind of a par-
ticular religious denomination, or of a beneficial association,
or of a political party, shuts them against the public. A
known and recognized class, though not generally poor or
diseased or decrepit, may be the subject of a public charity,
as sailors; yet if the endowment were limited in its benefits
to sailors who are members of a designated sect, there could
hardly be two opinions of its character." . . "Private or in-
dividual gain in a pecuraary sense is not the sole test. 'The
true test is to be found in the objects of the institution.' Where
these are to advance the interest of a party, of an association, of a
private corporation, of a religious denomination, and the like, how-
ever beneficial to the public their growth and success may be, there
is a private object to gain ; the institution is not unqualifiedly
public. In such cases the purpose is wholly private, or the private
blends with the public."
Opinion by GREEN, J.- "But there is another and a broader
ground upon which this particular charity must be sustained as
purely public. It is this: The third class of persons enumerated
in the will of the testatrix as the objects of her bounty are 'all
other white female orphan children of legitimate birth, not less
than four years of age and of not more than eight years, without
respect to any other description or qualification whatever.. . . . "
1"Now, in legal contemplation, the persons of the third
class are beneficiaries upon the same title and with the same ab-
stract rights as those of the first and second."
* . . "'But it is said that the children of the general public will
be in point of fact excluded, because the preferred classes will
always exhaust the physical capacity of the charity." . . . "If it
were proper to dispose of the question by considering the proba-
bilities as to the facts, we think they favor the theory that the chil-
dren of the third class would have free admission to the asylum."
"Why, then, would not a charity for the support of poor Epis-
copalians, Catholics, Jews or Presbyterians of a state or city be
purely public; or a charity for the education and maintenance of
the orphan children of such persons? No private gain or profit is
subserved; the objects of such a charity are certain and definite,
and the persons benefited are indefinite within the specified class.
The circumstance that the beneficiaries are to be of a particular
religious faith is only of importance as designating the class. It
indicates a certain portion of the whole community who are to be
recipients of the charity. It has the same effect in this respect as
the words seamen, stonemasons, blind persons, poor widows, &c.,
in the cases already mentioned. For the purpose of defining the
class of persons who, as distinguished from all other persons in the
community, are to enjoy the benefit of the donor's bounty, the
legal effect is the same, whether the words used be seamen, Episco-
palians, blind persons, Catholics, poor widows, Jews, stonemasons
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or Presbyterians. The argument that to sustain, as purely public,
a charity in favor of persons of a particular religious faith would
be to maintain sectarianism, is of no weight. It is not discrimina-
tion in favor of a sect, for it is treating all sects alike. It is not
even extending a preference to sectarians; it is merely recog-
nizing them as a class of persons. We see no reason why that
community which ranges persons into classes, so far as this subject
is concerned, may not be a community of religious faith as well as
of occupation, condition in life, sex, color, age, disability, physi-
cal or mental, or nationality."
It should be noted that the opinion by Trunkey, J., puts
the decision squarely upon the ground that the benefits of the
institution are confined to members of the Protestant Epis-
copal Church. In overruling that decision, the opinion by
Green, J., sustains the claim to exemption upon "another and
a broader ground," to wit: That the charity is open as well
to "the orphan children of the general public," who are " in
legal contemplation . . . beneficiaries upon the same title and
with the same abstract rights." Touching the sectarian phase
of the discussion, therefore, it is manifest that the remarks of
Trunkey, J., should be accorded great weight and signifi-
cance. And may not the allusion by Green, J., to "the
orphan children of the general public" (that is, within the
specified class), as distinguished from the orphan children that
are members of the Protestant Episcopal Church, be accepted
as a tacit recognition of the persistency of the doctrine that a
gift to a sect is not a gift to the general public?
The case of Northampton County v. Lafayette College' was
argued in the Supreme Court in 1889.' Williams, J., deliv-
ered the unanimous opinion of the Court, in the course of
which he says:
"We come now to the other and broader question. Is Lafayette
College entitled to ask exemption from taxation under the Consti-
tution and the Act of 1874? That depends on whether it was
founded and endowed and is maintained by public or private
charity. It appears by the Act of Incorporation, § i, Art. 8, that
128 Pa. 132 (1889).
2 Before Sterrett, Clark, Williams, McCollum, and Mitchell, JJ.; of
whom all but Clark, J., are members of the Supreme Court at the
present time.
TAXATION AS A " PURELY PUBLIC CHARITY? "
'persons of every religious denomination shall be capable of being
elected trustees,' and that no person, either as principal, professor,
tutor or pupil, can be refused admission into the college or denied
participation in any of its privileges, immunities or advantages on
account of his religious belief. In § 3 it is subjected to visitation
by the state government; its books, papers and all its concerns
and transactions may be investigated by the official visitors, and
they are to make a detailed report to the. Governor, which he in
turn is required to lay before the legislature. The institution is
thus seen to be not a mere sectarian or denominational school,
but a secular organization under an act of the legislature, subject
to the visitation and control of the state and open as to the mem-
bership of its board of trustees, as to its professorships and as to
admission to its classes, to all persons. It is a public institution in
the broadest sense of the word."
I" Upon these facts we hold that Lafayette College is a
secular, not an ecclesiastical institution ; that it is subject to the
control of the state; that it is open to all shades of religious
opinion, so that neither as trustee, teacher or scholar does eligi-
bility depend on church membership or religious opinion. It is
public in its character, in its objects, in its control-and, if a char-
ity, is a purely public one."
In Episcopal Academy v. Philadelphia,l which was argued in
the Supreme Court in 1892,2 Williams, J., who delivered the
unanimous opinion of the Court, devotes no little attention to
the question of sectarianism, and finally concludes that the
Episcopal Academy is not open to that objection. He says:
"The admission of pupils is not limited to children of members
of the Episcopal Church either by the charter, the rules or the prac-
tice of the schools, but it is quite evident that such children are
preferred." . . . "The school is not open in the same way to the
general public as to persons connected with the Episcopal Church,
but they are admitted as vacancies occur, and, when admitted, it is
upon the same terms with all other pupils." . . . "The fact that
the school is under the control of a denomination or religious sect,
and that a preference is given to children of parents connected
with the denomination, does not destroy its character as a public
charity, since no one is excluded by reason of denominational con-
nection or preference, but such persons are admitted as fast as va-
cancies occur."
1 150 Pa. 565 (1892).
2 Before Paxson, C. J., and Green, Williams, McCollum, Mitchell, and
Heydrick, JJ., all of whom, excepting Paxson, C. J., and Heydrick, J.,
are members of the present Supreme Bench.
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In the case of Sunday School Union v. Pliladellia,1 which
was argued in the Supreme Court in 1894,' Williams, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in the course of which he calls attention
to the fact that the charity in question (to which the other
members of the Court had denied exemption) "is undenomi-
national in its spirit, its organization and its methods."
The recent case of Pziladepzia v. .lfasonic Home3 is not far
from being an adjudication of the question under discussion.
That case was first argued in the Supreme Court in 1893 ;
and in 1894 was reargued before the Justices that constitute
the present Supreme Bench.' The opinion of the Court was
delivered by Dean, J., and Williams, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Green, J., concurred. The Masonic Home
was denied exemption because its benefits were restricted to
Freemasons.
The institution was pronounced a private charity, because
the right to admission was made to depend upon the fact of
voluntary affiliation with the order of Freemasonry. The test
is said to be:
"Is any member of humanity-that greater public of whom the
Commonwealth is constructively the parent or trustee-excluded
because he has not a particular relation to some society, church or
other organization, which relation is dependent on his wholly vol-
untary act."
In view of this test, which by plain implication assigns the
institution under consideration to the class of private chari-
ties, it seems worth while to consider the opinion of the Court
in the case of the Masonic Home with great particularity and
care.
The opinion sets out with this pertinent assertion: "There
is nothing of doubt in this case except the question as to
whether the appellee is an "institution of purely public char-
ity.'" And proceeds as follows:
16r Pa. 307 (1894).
2 Before Sterrett, C. J., and Green, Williams, Mitchell, and Dean, JJ.
16o Pa. 572 (1894).
'Sterrett, C. J., and Green, Williams, McCollum, Mitchell, Dean, and
Fell, JJ.
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"The appellee clearly is a charity. It provides for and main-
tains in the Masonic Home indigent, afflicted and aged Freema-
sons. This, too, from voluntary contributions, without charge to
the beneficiaries and with no profit either to the corporation or to
its officers. Not one of the corporate officers receives a cent of
compensation for administering its affairs." . . . "Of course, if
this be not purely charity, nothing is." . . . "But, is it a public
charity? The word ' public' relates to or affects the whole people
of a nation or state." . . "Here, while the charter and by-laws
of the institution do not show that it is not ' purely public,' I the
undisputed facts as to the administration of the charity show that
none were admitted except Freemasons, of course excluding all
other aged and indigent men, because they had not chosen to be-
come members of a particular society. This made admission de-
pend on an artificial badge of distinction, and not on one incident
to humanity-and, therefore, it is not ' purely public.' If this be
purely public, then what is not purely public?" . . . "A charity
may restrict its admissions to a class of humanity, and still be
public; it may be for the blind, the mute, those suffering under
special diseases, for the aged, for infants, for women, for men, for
different callings or trades by which humanity earns its bread, and
as long as the classification is determined by some distinction
which involuntarily affects or may affect any of the whole people,
although only a small number may be directly benefited, it is
public." . . . "It must be purely public-that is, there must be
no admixture of any qualification for admission heterogeneous and
not solely relating to the public." . . . "Nor does the argument
that, to the extent it benefits Masons, it necessarily relieves the
public burden, affect the question. There is no public burden for
the relief of aged and indigent Masons ; there is the public burden
of caring for and relieving aged and indigent men, whether they
be Masons or anti-Masons. But age and indigence concern the
public no further than the fact of them ; it makes no inquiry into
the social relations of the subjects of them."
By plain analogy the institution in hand, too, must be ad-
judged a private charity. A necessary conclusion, foreshown
in the same opinion by the following apposite dictum: "A
home without charge, exclusively for Presbyterians, Episco-
palians, Catholics or Methodists, would not be a public
charity."
It may be suggested that, while admission.to the Masonic
Fraternity depends upon the joint action of the applicant and
the Fraternity, admission to a sect rests upon the will of the
I The words are "a home for Freemasons, &c., and for such others as
may be placed under its charge."
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applicant alone; and that, therefore, the door of the sectarian
charity is open to tke general public. But the vice of the
reasoning is twofold. On the one hand, the act of joining a
church is, apart from the question of creedal conviction, still
a "wholly voluntary act" within the definition of the Supreme
Court; and, on the other hand, the invariable condition
touching the acceptance of the sectarian tenets is quite op-
posed to the idea of "public," and in no right view a mere
matter of form.
Clearly, in the case of the Masonic Home, the circumstance
that all the beneficiaries down to the time of the litigation
had been "Free and Accepted Masons " had no bearing upon
the decision; the significant and controlling fact was that the
required relationship of the beneficiaries to that particular or-
ganization was the result of their wholly voluntary act. In
its legal aspect, the question is not whether membership in this
or that particular society is within reach of all, but whether
such membership is dependent upon a voluntary act. Or, in
the language of the Supreme Court, is such membership a
"distinction which involuntarily affects or may [so] affect any
of the whole people?" Even if the doors of Freemasonry
were open to all comers, the Masonic Home must remain a
private charity; for participation in its bounty would still de-
pend upon the fact (not the contingent result, for application
would then be equivalent to admission) of a "wholly volun-
tary act."
On the other hand, is it in any proper sense true that ad-
mission to a sect is within the reach of all? To put the ques-
tion is to answer it. Does a man's "conscientious persuasion
or practice" count for nothing in these latter days ? Can this
be 'the full enjoyment of Christian liberty' secured to our
people two hundred years ago ? The Christian martyrs of
old judged it a joy to die for their faith, and shall we of to-
day be told that apostasy is no condition-no barrier? And
this in the name of charity! No; the institution that de-
mands such a price for its bounty cannot, in conscience, be
adjudged a purely public charity.
And, so, whether by dint of the American-born principle of
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religious liberty-at once the origin and the achievement of
American civilization-or by virtue of the plain and practical
rule laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of the Ma-
sonic Home, a sectarian charity, it may be affirmed, is not
"purely public" under the Constitution of Pennsylvania, and,
therefore, not exempt from taxation.
Willianl e. 8eredith.
Philadelphia, September 8, :1898. .
